To promote the high-quality development of listed companies, it is necessary to accurately address pain points and difficulties, and improve the new ecosystem of high-quality development that integrates "governance return restructuring" through systematic measures, so that development achievements can be more sustainable and development efficiency can be fully released. In 2025, A-share listed companies will have a strong development momentum, with a total market value exceeding 123 trillion yuan, an average price to book ratio increasing from 3.3 at the beginning of the year to 4.4, over 200 major asset restructurings, and a total cash dividend repurchase of 2.68 trillion yuan for the year. This impressive answer sheet demonstrates the development confidence of A-share listed companies and lays a solid foundation for the high-quality development of China's capital market. The 2026 System Work Conference of the China Securities Regulatory Commission took advantage of the situation and proposed to "adhere to strengthening the foundation and promoting the value growth and governance improvement of listed companies", which clearly defined a further path for the high-quality development of listed companies in the new stage. By 2025, A-share listed companies will achieve significant breakthroughs in the three core areas of mergers and acquisitions, corporate governance, and shareholder returns, and their development quality will be synchronized with market vitality. The merger and acquisition market has completed an important advancement from "quantity increase" to "quality improvement", with 70% of the targets focusing on strategic emerging industries such as semiconductors and new energy. Not only is the transaction structure more optimized and the industry logic dominant, but it also highlights the active layout of listed companies in new quality productivity. Among them, the case of Jingwei Huikai's acquisition of ZTE System's private network communication layout provides a reference for traditional enterprises to find the "second growth curve". The level of standardization in corporate governance continues to improve, with regulatory authorities intensively introducing new governance regulations, revising the "Code of Governance for Listed Companies", publicly soliciting opinions on the "Regulations on the Supervision and Administration of Listed Companies", and strengthening constraints on key entities. According to the performance evaluation of the China Association of Listed Companies, the vast majority of listed companies have optimized the efficiency of the "three meetings" operation, with over 70% conducting voluntary information disclosure and 90% actively expanding the boundaries of business information disclosure, significantly enhancing the endogenous driving force of governance. The shareholder return system continues to improve, with a total cash dividend repurchase of 2.68 trillion yuan for the whole year, reaching a historical high, and multiple dividends in a year becoming the norm. The measures of returning real money and silver to shareholders effectively boosted market confidence, steadily boosted the overall valuation of A-shares, increased the proportion of A-share allocation in public funds by 2.4 percentage points, and accelerated the formation of a positive cycle of "return confidence investment" in the market. Behind the impressive achievements, it should be noted that there are still many deep-seated problems in the development of A-share listed companies. The structural weaknesses in the three major areas of mergers and acquisitions, corporate governance, and shareholder returns urgently need to be addressed. Mergers and acquisitions are constrained by valuation differences and difficult integration, resulting in a blind cross-border integration failure rate of over 20%; Science and technology innovation enterprises have a single financing channel and insufficient long-term funds, and policy implementation and cross departmental collaboration need to be strengthened. There are formal issues with corporate governance, with multiple companies being investigated for violating credit disclosure regulations, independent directors performing their duties insufficiently, controlling shareholders still occupying funds and providing illegal guarantees, and loopholes in the protection of small and medium-sized investors. To promote the high-quality development of listed companies, it is necessary to accurately address pain points and difficulties, and improve the new ecosystem of high-quality development that integrates "governance return restructuring" through systematic measures, so that development achievements can be more sustainable and development efficiency can be fully released. Further improve the full chain support system for mergers and acquisitions, refine the criteria for identifying "industrial logic mergers and acquisitions", establish a post merger performance commitment tracking mechanism, and guide listed companies to price rationally and focus on integrating their main businesses. Expand the financing channels for mergers and acquisitions of science and technology innovation enterprises, encourage the participation of long-term funds such as insurance and pension funds, and launch special bonds for mergers and acquisitions to provide stable financial support for technology mergers and acquisitions. Refine policy implementation details, clarify cross departmental collaboration processes, establish a policy implementation tracking mechanism, regularly evaluate policy implementation effectiveness, and ensure that policy dividends are accurately transmitted to enterprises. Comprehensively deepen reform and accelerate the construction of a new paradigm of investor oriented corporate governance through internal and external coordination. From an internal perspective, promoting listed companies to establish a governance structure with clear rights and responsibilities and effective checks and balances, binding the interests of management and small and medium-sized shareholders through equity incentives, solving the stubborn problem of "one share dominance", improving the mechanism for selecting and appointing independent directors, enhancing professional performance, and clarifying the specific rights and responsibilities of independent directors in information disclosure, strategic supervision, and other aspects. Externally, it is necessary to strengthen the responsibility of intermediary agencies as gatekeepers and implement lifelong accountability for the dereliction of duty of auditing, law firms and other intermediary agencies. Activate the control market, broaden channels for small and medium-sized investors to express their demands, improve the collective litigation system, and enhance the pertinence and transparency of information disclosure. Establish a long-term return mechanism that is deeply adapted to the development of enterprises, guide listed companies to formulate differentiated dividend policies, and require enterprises to disclose the basis and long-term planning for dividend policy formulation. Raise the financing threshold for companies that continue to raise funds without dividends for a long time, require them to supplement disclosure of the purpose of funds and profit expectations, and build a solid foundation of market trust. (Xinhua News Agency) Author: Tian Xuan (Peking University Boya Distinguished Professor, Ministry of Education "Changjiang Scholar" Distinguished Professor)