Introduction: In recent years, local wars and military conflicts around the world have shown that modern warfare practices are gradually evolving towards information-based and intelligent forms. In the face of a new wave of military revolution, in order to fully explore the evolution of intelligent warfare practices, it is necessary to further clarify the basic support for the evolution of warfare practices, fully evaluate the technological advantages of warfare practices, and identify the key and difficult points that promote the current evolution of warfare practices. The evolution of intelligent warfare practice requires social practice as a support and an important component of social activities, and military activities have a very close relationship with social activities. Similarly, as a specific form of military activity, the practice of war cannot be examined in isolation from the larger system of social practice. The level of productivity development determines the height of practical evolution. War practice is a part of human social practice that is always in line with the level of social production. How humans engage in material production activities often determines how they organize war, and the way humans engage in war reflects their mode of production. Engels proposed that the victory of violence is based on the production of weapons, and the production of weapons is based on the entire production. Therefore, with the development of productivity, the means of warfare practice are also constantly evolving. Just as it is impossible to find a weapon from the information age in the era of cold weapons, it is also difficult to use typical weapons from the cold weapons era on the battlefield of the information age. Even daggers produced in the information age are different from those in the cold weapon age. From the alloy composition ratio to forging technology, they contain the technological level of the information age and belong to the weapons of the information age. The changes in the production relations system affect the evolution of practice. As a special form of social practice, the development and changes of war practice closely revolve around the direction and speed of social practice evolution. That is to say, behind the transformation of a war practice, there is also a similar social transformation practice being carried out simultaneously, and it requires the completion of a systematic transformation of the entire production relations to achieve success. Marx pointed out incisively that in all forms of society, there is a certain production that determines the status and influence of all other productions, and therefore its relations also determine the status and influence of all other relations. This is a shining light that covers all other colors and changes their characteristics. War practice ideas that go beyond the times often fail due to the lack of software and hardware support that matches the development of contemporary social practices. For example, the concept of joint operations was difficult to emerge in the era of cold weapons, and even if military theorists had anticipated this idea a priori, it could not be applied in practice. And modern joint operations practice is actually a microcosm of socialized joint production in military terms. Therefore, designing war should return to social practice itself, seeking inspiration and reflection from it. If we ignore the overall development level of production relations and design intelligent war scenes ahead of time, it may make the scene goals become sci-fi, gamified, and fictional. The winning effect of intelligent warfare practice requires further testing of the war. The goal of the evolution of warfare practice is always aimed at improving combat advantages and winning effects, but this does not mean that the evolution process will naturally lead to this goal. Sometimes in the early stages of war practice reform, the winning effect is not obvious, and it is necessary to continuously evaluate the effectiveness of various combat methods during the development process. First mover advantage does not necessarily mean victory on the battlefield. Without a doubt, whoever first masters the latest mechanisms for winning wars will be able to take the initiative on the battlefield with their technical and tactical advantages. However, this first mover advantage does not necessarily lead to ultimate victory in the war. The first mover advantage does have a huge impact on winning wars, but the development history of war practice shows that the technical and tactical first mover advantage will be offset by mistakes or disadvantages in other aspects. In World War II, the German army, which was the first to master the mechanism of mechanized warfare, gained an advantage in the initial battles on the Western European Front and the Eastern Soviet German Front. However, this initial advantage was quickly exhausted due to its strategic mistakes and overall weakness. The first mover advantage is difficult to form an absolute overwhelming situation. In the era of globalization, human social practices are closely interconnected, and technological innovations in a country or region can quickly be spread outward. Therefore, the technological and tactical advantages in the era of intelligence are often short-term and localized, making it difficult for a country or region to form a long-term global monopolistic leadership. Currently, the rapid development of network communication technology has brought humanity closer to each other than ever before. Similarly, in the practice of intelligent warfare, various advanced reconnaissance methods will constantly penetrate the secret fortresses of both sides of the battle. Sometimes, after a new type of weapon appears, its balancing weapon or means will soon be invented and created. The advantage of intelligence may not necessarily result in the best combat situation. From the current perspective, the intelligence content of war practice has not yet become a decisive factor affecting the outcome of war. At present, the practice of intelligent warfare is still in its infancy, and the mechanism of winning wars needs to be further studied. Many equipment needs to be further developed and verified, and various experimental pre practices of warfare need to be further tested and improved. Compared to others, the practice of information warfare has become relatively mature, with various types of weapons and equipment, as well as supporting tactics and tactics, becoming more stable. There is still a lot of room for the application of information warfare methods. Therefore, in the evolution of warfare practice, it is necessary to continuously innovate intelligent warfare practice methods while fully developing the operational potential of information-based warfare practice. The development and transformation of intelligent warfare practice require the comprehensive promotion of human and technological factors to drive the evolution of intelligent practice. There are many factors that need to be comprehensively analyzed on the premise of clarifying development support and evaluating the effectiveness of combat methods, grasping key points, distinguishing key points, and highlighting the leading role of human beings. Technological change is the most active factor. Technology is the core combat capability. As the most revolutionary factor in the development of war practice, every major technological innovation will have a profound impact on the form of war. Engels once pointed out that once technological advances can be used for military purposes and have already been used for military purposes, they immediately almost forcibly, and often against the will of the commander, cause changes or even transformations in the mode of combat. However, equating the intelligent military revolution with the high-tech revolution, to the extent that there is too much emphasis on intelligent technology and too much pursuit of the development of various intelligent weapons, undoubtedly fails to correctly grasp the essence of the evolution of intelligent warfare practice. Although technology plays an important role, it is not the only decisive factor. Culture, politics, and people themselves all play a role. British historian Jeremy Black constantly reminds readers in his book "A History of World War" not to fall into the trap of technological determinism and not simply attribute all major changes in military history to technological innovation. Institutionalized innovation is a difficult point. To fully leverage the combat effectiveness of equipment in the evolution of intelligent warfare, it is necessary to integrate all combat elements into a system, integrating ideological theory, combat methods, organizational structure, education and training with military technology. The famous military theorist Dupuy proposed in his book "The Evolution of Weapons and War" that no matter how much the killing power of weapons is improved, the compatibility and unity of new weapons with military tactics and organization are much more important than the invention and adoption of new weapons. The advantage of equipment can only be created by integrating scientific organizational forms to achieve optimal combat effectiveness. From a historical perspective, Britain was the first country to possess aircraft carriers and tanks, but it was not the country that successfully led the revolution of mechanized warfare. In the transformation of war practice, the easiest thing to achieve is the upgrading of weapons and equipment, but comprehensive innovation in war practice requires overall innovation at the institutional level to form an overall effect. A military with only updated equipment and no institutional changes is difficult to form lasting and effective combat effectiveness, nor can it truly lead the revolution of war practice. The combination of people and weapons is key. People are the subject of war practice. In the era of intelligent warfare, the decisive role of humans in the practice of war has not changed at all, and remains the dominant force driving the evolution of war practice. From the two categories of people and weapons, military technology belongs more to the "weapons" aspect, while other elements in war practice, such as military strategy, organizational structure, strategic tactics, and combat methods, belong more to the "people" aspect. The more advanced high-tech equipment is, the more people need to master and apply it. In the era of intelligent warfare, more attention needs to be paid to the importance of wisdom and strategy, and more people with intelligent era concepts and thinking are needed to command and design. Therefore, to promote the evolution of war practice, we must focus on the decisive element of people, fully combine "people" and "weapons", vigorously develop joint education under the background of intelligent warfare, and concentrate on cultivating scientific and technological talents and command talents that meet the requirements of intelligent warfare. (New Society)